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MISGUIDED REGULATION OF 
INTERCHANGE FEES: THE CONSUMER 
IMPACT OF THE DURBIN AMENDMENT 
Patrick C. McGinnis 
I. INTRODUCTION 
uring a famous episode of Seinfeld, Jerry performs a stand-
up routine about how women prefer to make purchases with 
checks.1 In contrast, men seem to find checks unmanly, as they 
are like, “A note from your mother that says, ‘I don’t have any 
money, but if you contact these people, I’m sure they’ll stick up 
for me.’”2 This episode aired in 1990 and while this is simply a 
humorous interpretation of an everyday event, it highlights a 
period of transition from predominantly using checks for 
purchases to debit cards. For consumers, debit cards limit 
liability when a card is stolen, offer easy access to Automated 
Teller Machines (“ATMs”) and points of sale, allow for more 
efficient record keeping of transactions, and provide a safe 
alternative to carrying large sums of cash.3 In 2009, consumers 
made almost thirty-eight billion debit card transactions in the 
United States, accounting for 35% of all non-cash payments.4 
Debit cards have now surpassed checks as the most frequently 
used method of payment.5 
However, unlike checks, debit card transactions generate 
an interchange fee, which is paid by the merchant to the 
                                                 
 1  Seinfeld: The Stake Out (NBC television broadcast May 31, 1990). 
 2  Id. 
 3  Mercator Advisory Group, The Durbin Amendment: Impact Analysis 5 
(June 7, 2010), available at 
http://www.mercatoradvisorygroup.com/images/durbin_analysis.pdf. 
 4  TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, No. CIV 10-4149, 2011 WL 1578535, at 
*2 (S.D. Apr. 25, 2011)(affirmed by TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, 643 F.3d 
1148 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 5  Id. 
D 
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cardholder’s issuing bank.6 In response to the soaring cost of 
interchange fees, United States Senator Dick Durbin negotiated 
the inclusion of an amendment in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.7 Known as the 
“Durbin Amendment,” this provision sought to ensure that “[t]he 
amount of any interchange transaction fee that an issuer may 
receive or charge with respect to an electronic debit transaction 
shall be reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred by the 
issuer with respect to the transaction.”8 Senator Durbin contends 
that this amendment will help regulate interchange fees, resulting 
in lower prices for both consumers and merchants.9 
This Note examines the impact the implementation of the 
Durbin Amendment has had on consumers thus far. It 
demonstrates how reduced interchange fees have not led to 
reduced prices for consumers and how the reduced revenues 
collected by banks on debit card transactions have led to the 
elimination of other consumer benefits. Part II provides 
background on the development of debit cards and the use of 
interchange fees.10 Part III explains the evolution of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and the 
inclusion of the Durbin Amendment.11 Part IV analyzes the 
impact of the Durbin Amendment and the effect it has had on 
consumers.12 Finally, Part V examines the outlook for the Durbin 
Amendment and its impact on consumers and the banking 
industry going forward.13 
                                                 
 6  Id. at 3. 
 7  Press Release, U.S. Senator Dick Durbin, Durbin, Local Business 
Owners Call for Prompt Federal Reserve Action on Swipe Fee Regulations 
(June 10, 2011), available at 
http://durbin.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=31031ccd-2dc6-
4045-886f-b7b5b02c1e26. 
 8  Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(2) (2010) (Section 
1075 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
amends the Electronic Fund Transfer Act to add a new Section 920). 
 9  Press Release, U.S. Senator Dick Durbin, Durbin: Lower Debit Card 
Swipe Fees Good For Consumers (Sep. 30, 2011), available at 
http://durbin.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/localnews?ID=717a4e2b-2958-460a-
9929-c30e7995c6fd. 
 10  See infra Part II. 
 11  See infra Part III. 
 12  See infra Part IV. 
 13  See infra Part V. 
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II. RISE OF DEBIT CARDS AND INTERCHANGE FEES 
This Note will first examine the fundamental aspects of 
how debit cards work and how they have become the prominent 
non-cash payment method within the United States. This section 
first examines the creation of ATM cards and explains how debit 
cards evolved from the development of ATM cards. Next, the 
increased use of debit cards during the 1990s is chronicled to 
highlight how debit cards have become so popular today. Finally, 
this section analyzes interchange fees and their vital role within 
debit card transactions. 
A.  General Descriptions of ATM Cards and Debit Cards 
What unites ATM and debit card transactions is that both 
deduct funds directly against the consumer’s bank account.14 
ATM and debit card transactions permit any bank to link its 
customers with the customers of another bank worldwide to 
transact business almost immediately.15 While ATM and debit 
cards may appear to serve the same function, there are 
distinctions that make each of them unique. 
An ATM card is used to withdraw cash from an 
automated teller machine.16 Consumers may use ATMs affiliated 
with their bank to perform regular banking transactions or any 
other ATM to withdraw money.17 The consumer enters a 
personal identification number (“PIN”) and the checking account 
is accessed to determine if adequate funds are available.18 If 
adequate funds are found, the cash is dispensed to the 
consumer.19 Today, ATM cards generally serve the dual purpose 
of both an ATM and debit card and can be used for either type of 
                                                 
 14  Fumiko Hayashi et al., A Guide to the ATM and Debit Card Industry 5 
(Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 2003), available at 
http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/psr/BksJournArticles/ATMpaper.pdf. 
 15  Understanding Interchange, MASTERCARD WORLDWIDE, 
http://www.mastercard.com/us/company/en/whatwedo/interchange.html (last 
visited Sep. 30, 2012). 
 16  Hayashi et al., supra note 14, at 5. 
 17  DAVID EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC: THE 
DIGITAL REVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BORROWING 298 (1st ed. MIT Press 
1999). 
 18  Hayashi et al., supra note 14, at 5. 
 19  Id. 
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transaction.20 
Debit cards are used in transactions for the purchase of 
goods or services.21 When consumers use their debit cards to 
make a purchase, they are required to either enter their PIN or 
sign a receipt to verify their identity.22 Next, an electronic-
authorization request is sent from the merchant to the merchant’s 
bank, which then forwards this request to the issuing bank.23 The 
issuing bank checks the corresponding account for adequate 
funds and sends a message authorizing or declining the 
transaction.24 The merchant is then reimbursed by the issuing 
bank for the price of the transaction.25 
B. ATM Cards and the Development of Debit Cards 
The first ATM in the United States was developed in 
1969.26 By the early 1970s, ATMs were capable of taking 
deposits, transferring money between checking and savings 
accounts, dispensing cash from a credit card, and accepting bill 
payments.27 Banks soon began establishing shared ATM 
networks, and by 1977 the networks had online access to account 
information.28 
Regional ATM networks then began recognizing that 
ATM cards could provide a convenient payment method at 
stores.29 By the 1980s, supermarkets and other retailers began 
testing point-of-sale (“POS”) debit systems.30 Shortly thereafter, 
merchants began installing PIN pad devices to process the POS 
debit transactions.31 However, during the 1980s the number of 
POS debit transactions remained relatively modest.32 
                                                 
 20  Id. 
 21  Id. 
 22  Id. 
 23  TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, No. CIV 10-4149, 2011 WL 1578535, at 
*2 (S.D. Apr. 25, 2011)(affirmed by TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, 643 F.3d 
1148 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 24  Id. 
 25  Hayashi et al., supra note 14, at 5. 
 26  EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 17, at 298. 
 27  Hayashi et al., supra note 14, at 12. 
 28  Id. at 14. 
 29  EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 17, at 298. 
 30  Hayashi et al., supra note 14, at 14. 
 31  EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 17, at 298. 
 32  Hayashi et al., supra note 14, at 14. 
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C. Growth of the Debit Card in the 1990’s and Beyond 
Several factors led to the growth of debit card transactions 
during the 1990s. First, ATM cards had become extremely 
common. In 1990, over 200 million consumers had ATM cards 
providing access to about 80,000 ATMs.33 The ATM cards that 
consumers already possessed provided a simple transition for 
ATM networks seeking to expand to debit transactions.34 Another 
reason for the growth of debit card transactions was the 
installation of PIN pads in retail stores across the country. 
Merchants realized the advantage of installing PIN pads because 
debit transactions offered a guaranteed payment, a proven 
increase in sales, lower labor cost through reduced transaction 
times, and the elimination of the risk of bad checks.35 The 
number of PIN pads in retail stores throughout the United States 
increased almost tenfold from 53,000 in 1990 to 529,000 in 1995.36 
This number tripled to 1.7 million PIN pads by 1998 and 
increased to over 6.6 million in 2009.37  
A third reason for this growth was that ATM networks 
became increasingly interconnected. While only 14% of ATM 
networks were shared networks in 1980, by 1990 nearly 94% of 
networks were shared.38 With 100% of networks being shared by 
1996, POS debit transactions became much easier to implement.39 
Additionally, in 1990 an agreement was reached between Cirrus 
and Plus, the two major ATM networks, which permitted ATM 
owners to service customers from the other network without 
incurring additional membership fees.40 These developments 
established a national network and assured universal access to 
ATM services.41 Aggressive marketing by banks to encourage the 
use of debit cards and the emergence of Visa and MasterCard’s 
off-line debit products, which do not require the use of a PIN, 
further stimulated the environment for the growth of debit cards 
                                                 
 33  EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 17, at 303. 
 34  Id. at 301. 
 35  Mercator Advisory Group, supra note 3. 
 36  EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 17, at 308-09. 
 37  Id. at 309. 
 38  Hayashi et al., supra note 14. 
 39  EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 17, at 306. 
 40  Hayashi et al., supra note 14. 
 41  Id. 
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and debit card transactions.42 
Although debit card transactions were negligible in 
relation to all non-cash payment methods at the start of the 1990s, 
by 2000 over 11.6% of non-cash payments were made with debit 
cards.43 By the end of the 1990s, over 235 million debit cards were 
in circulation in the United States.44 Debit cards totaled over 509 
million in 2009 with a purchase volume of over $1.4 trillion in 
throughout the United States.45 According to the 2009 Survey of 
Consumer Payment Choice, debit cards are used for 29.3% of all 
transactions and have become the most frequently used method 
of payment, eclipsing cash, credit cards, and checks 
individually.46 
D. Understanding Interchange Fees 
The increased use of debit cards has led to an explosion in 
revenue collected by banks for what are known as interchange 
fees. Interchange fees are small fees paid by the merchant’s 
acquiring bank to the cardholder’s issuing bank for debit card 
transactions.47 After debit card transactions are authorized, the 
issuing bank posts a charge for the transaction on the consumer’s 
bank account and transfers the funds minus the interchange rate 
to the acquiring bank.48 The acquiring bank then posts the funds 
minus the interchange rate to the merchant’s bank account.49 The 
revenue from interchange fees is divided amongst the issuing 
                                                 
 42  Id. 
 43  Id. 
 44  U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, Table 
1188 (2012), available at 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1187.pdf. 
 45  U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, Table 
1187 (2012), available at 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1187.pdf. 
 46 Kevin Foster et al., The 2009 Survey of Consumer Payment Choice, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Public Policy Discussion Paper No. 11-1 
(April 2011). 
 47  Interchange: Facilitating Benefits to Cardholders, Merchants, and 
Society, MASTERCARD WORLDWIDE, 
http://www.mastercard.com/us/company/en/docs/Interchange_Benefits.pdf 
(last visited Sep. 30, 2012). 
 48  TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, No. CIV 10-4149, 2011 WL 1578535, at 
*2 (S.D. Apr. 25, 2011)(affirmed by TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, 643 F.3d 
1148 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 49   Id. 
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bank, the acquiring bank, and the network that supplies the card 
swipe machine, while the merchants generally bear the cost.50 
Financial institutions contend that interchange fees serve 
as “a critical tool to balance the benefits and costs of electronic 
payments, and ensure that each participant pays their fair share 
associated with processing and protecting payment card 
transactions.”51 Consumers also benefit from the resources 
created by interchange fees through benefits such as the ability to 
make secure worldwide payments in a fraction of a second.52 
These fees totaled over $16.2 billion in 2009 with the average fee 
of $0.44 per transaction.53 
The assignment of interchange fees for debit card 
transactions has changed over time as banks debate which party 
benefits most from the transaction.54 The interchange fee initially 
went from the issuing bank to the acquiring bank, but this is now 
reversed.55 Merchants have long argued that issuing banks should 
simply pay acquiring banks because the issuing banks save 
money on the transaction through reduced paper check 
processing costs.56 While merchants have largely been 
unsuccessful at deferring the costs of these transactions to the 
banks, the dynamics of the interchange arrangements changed 
with the implementation of the Durbin Amendment. Now, banks 
are no longer able to recoup the cost of debit card transactions 
from merchants, so the cost is now being passed along to 
consumers.   
III. THE WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO 
REGULATE INTERCHANGE FEES 
In order to fully understand the Durbin Amendment, it is 
essential to understand the environment in which it was 
                                                 
 50  Christopher Maag, Interchange Fees: The Billion Dollar Fight for 
Control of Your Wallet, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 18, 2011), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/interchange-fees-the-billion-dollar-fight-for-
control-of-your-wallet-2011-3. 
 51  MASTERCARD WORLDWIDE, supra note 47. 
 52  Id. 
 53  TCF National Bank, 2011 WL 1578535, at *3. 
 54  EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 17, at 307. 
 55  Id. at 306. 
 56  Id. 
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developed and implemented. This section provides the historical 
foundation of the financial crisis in the United States and the 
creation of a climate ripe for new banking regulations. Next, the 
Dodd-Frank Act will be explained to convey the framework 
within which the Durbin Amendment was created. Finally, this 
section will review the Durbin Amendment and its general 
implications for debit card transactions. 
A. Banking Regulation and the U.S. Financial Crisis 
After the stock market crash of 1929 and the failure of 
thousands of banks the United States government passed the 
Banking Act of 1933.57 Known as the Glass-Steagall Act, this 
New Deal legislation sought to regulate banks by: 1) separating 
commercial banks from investment banks in order to shield bank 
account funds from risky investments and 2) creating the Federal 
Depository Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to insure bank 
deposits.58 After a period of increasing financial industry 
deregulation President Bill Clinton signed into law the Financial 
Services Modernization Act in 1999.59 This legislation repealed 
many of the banking regulations of the Glass-Steagall Act, 
including the separation of commercial banks from investment 
banks.60 
Beginning in 2008, the United States underwent the worst 
financial crisis since the Great Depression.61 Many believed that a 
major cause of this financial crisis had been the repeal of Glass-
Steagall and the deregulation of the banking industry.62 At the 
very least, financial instruments and new forms of financing 
within the banking industry exacerbated the American financial 
situation.63 In response, many Americans called for a new 
                                                 
 57  Glass-Steagall, Dodd-Frank and the Volker Rule: A Primer and 
Resources, BILLMOYERS.COM (Mar. 16, 2012), 
http://billmoyers.com/content/glass-steagall-dodd-frank-and-the-volcker-rule-
a-primer-and-resources [hereinafter Glass-Steagall]. 
 58  Id. 
 59  Id. 
 60  Id. 
 61   David A. Skeel Jr., The New Financial Deal: Understanding the Dodd-
Frank Act And its (Unintended) Consequences, U. of Penn., Inst. for Law & 
Econ. Research Paper No. 10-21 (October 2010). 
 62  Glass-Steagall, supra note 57. 
 63   Skeel, supra note 61. 
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regulation system that could deal with the intricacies of the 
twenty-first century financial system.64 
B. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
In March 2009, the Department of the Treasury released 
its framework for regulating the banking industry in its “Rules 
for the Regulatory Road.”65 The Treasury later released a more 
detailed white paper that served as a template for the 
congressional legislation that would later pass.66 The House of 
Representatives passed legislation proposed by Congressman 
Barney Frank, Chairman of the Committee on Financial 
Services, on December 11, 2009.67 The Senate passed its own 
version of this bill, proposed by Senator Christopher Dodd and 
known as the Restoring American Financial Stability Act, on 
May 20, 2010.68 A congressional committee was then appointed to 
work out the differences between the two bills.69 
On July 21, 2010, Congress passed and President Obama 
signed into law the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”).70 According to the 
Act’s subtitle, the legislation intended to, “Promote the financial 
stability of the United States by improving accountability and 
transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail,’ to 
protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect the 
consumers from abusive financial practices, and for other 
purposes.”71 The act provides for the creation of up to 400 new 
regulations and various new regulatory and watchdog agencies, 
including the Financial Stability Oversight Council, the Office of 
Financial Research, and the Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection.72 
                                                 
 64   Id. 
 65   Id. 
 66  David H. Carpenter, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act: Title X, The Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau, Congressional Research Service, 1 (July 21, 2010), available at 
http://www.llsdc.org/attachments/files/313/CRS-R41338.pdf. 
 67  Id. 
 68  Id. 
 69  Skeel, supra note 61. 
 70  TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, 643 F.3d 1158, 1161 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 71  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 72  Glass-Steagall, supra note 57. 
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C. The Durbin Amendment 
During the negotiations of the Dodd-Frank Act, Senator 
Dick Durbin saw an opportunity to implement regulations 
regarding bank fees on debit card transactions. According to 
Senator Durbin, the current system provided for “virtually no 
competition and no recourse for merchants exploited by the rate 
structures and fees” from the payment card networks.73 Senator 
Durbin argued, “[m]ost retailers have no bargaining power when 
it comes to how much they’re charged for the use of debit 
cards. . .[which] leads to higher prices for consumers.”74 
Consequently, the Dodd-Frank Act included what is 
commonly called the “Durbin Amendment.” Title X of the Dodd-
Frank Act, also known as the Consumer Financial Protection 
Act, specifically required the Federal Reserve Board to prescribe 
rules on debit card interchange fees that ensure they are 
“reasonable and proportional.”75 As a result, the Federal Reserve 
Board passed a rule on December 16, 2010 approving the 
implementation of the Durbin Amendment in the Dodd-Frank 
Act.76 The Rule initially established a cap on interchange fees at 
$0.12 per transaction for issuing banks that, together with their 
affiliates, have assets of $10 billion or more.77 Financial 
institutions responded by strongly opposing and lobbying against 
processing debit card payments at such a low rate.78 TCF 
                                                 
 73  Letter from Senator Richard J. Durbin, U.S. Senate, to Camden Fine, 
President and CEO, Indep. Cmty. Bankers of Am., and Dan Mica, President 
and CEO, Credit Union Nat’l Ass’n. (June 11, 2010), available at 
http://durbin.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=d9c42bd5-b945-
4bee-b025-55aab2fd586a. 
 74  Brandy Donaldson, Durbin: Lower Debit Card Swipe Fees Good for 
Consumers, Moline Dispatch & Rock Island Argus (Sep. 30 2011), available at 
http://durbin.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/localnews?ID=717a4e2b-2958-460a-
9929-c30e7995c6fd. 
 75  Carpenter, supra note 66.  
 76  Winston & Strawn LLP, Implementing the Durbin Amendment: What 
Was the Fed Thinking?, 1 (April 2011), available at 
http://www.winston.com/siteFiles/Publications/FRB_04_04_11_Briefing.pdf. 
 77  Press Release, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Dec. 
16, 2010), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20101216a.htm. 
 78  Herb Weisbaum, Farewell Debit Reward Cards: Banks, Credit Unions 
Ax Programs In Anticipation of New “Swipe-fee” Rules, NBCNEWS.COM, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42459217/ns/business-
consumer_news/t/farewell-debit-reward-cards/#.UGxxFFHDu8A (last visited 
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National Bank even filed a federal lawsuit against the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System claiming that the 
proposed interchange rate was below their cost to provide debit 
card services.79 The Federal Reserve Board ultimately issued a 
final ruling on June 29, 2011, capping debit interchange fees at 
$0.21 plus 0.05% of the transaction, and an additional cent for 
fraud prevention costs and eliminating the requirement that debit 
cards be processed on only one network.80 
Less controversial provisions of the Durbin Amendment 
include a provision that allows merchants to set a $10 minimum 
on credit card transactions and another provision that permits 
merchants to provide discounts to consumers who use a specific 
method of payment.81 These regulations are expected to save 
merchants an estimated $14-19 billion dollars a year in revenue 
issuing banks normally collect on debit card transactions.82 The 
interchange fee regulations stemming from the Durbin 
Amendment became effective October 1, 2011.83 
IV. CONSUMER IMPACT OF THE DURBIN AMENDMENT 
Senator Durbin explained that the purpose of the Durbin 
Amendment was to “help small businesses, merchants, and 
consumers by providing relief from high interchange fees for 
debit card transactions.”84 Proponents of the amendment base the 
benefit to consumers on the assumption that card issues will bear 
the cost of the lost revenue from reduced fees and that merchants 
will pass these savings onto consumers through lower prices.85 
                                                 
Sep. 27, 2012). 
 79  TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, 643 F.3d 1158, 1162 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 80  Press Release, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (May 
1, 2012), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20120501a.htm. 
 81  15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(b)(2-3) (2010). 
 82  Gerri Detweiler, What the Debit Card Interchange Rules Mean For 
Consumers, ABC NEWS (June 30, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/debit-
card-interchange-rules-consumers/story?id=13967755#.UGx2YFHDu8A. 
 83  Press Release, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (May 
1, 2012), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20120501a.htm. 
 84  156 Cong. Rec. S3695 (daily ed. May 13, 2010) (statement of Sen. 
Richard Durbin). 
 85  David C. John, The Durbin Debit Card Interchange Fee Cap Hurts 
Consumers, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (March 17, 2011), available at 
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Highlighting its purpose to help consumers, the Durbin 
Amendment was even included in the section of the Dodd-Frank 
Act entitled the Consumer Financial Protection Act.86 Despite its 
apparent intentions, the Durbin Amendment has not necessarily 
benefited consumers. This section will show that the 
Amendment’s implementation unintentionally eliminated certain 
benefits consumer’s received from using debit cards. 
A. Merchant Savings Have Not Reduced Consumer Prices 
There has been significant debate about whether 
merchants will pass along the savings from reduced interchange 
fees to consumers in the form of reduced prices or if they will 
simply retain the savings as profit.87 Advocates such as Travis 
Plunkett with the Consumer Federation of America argue that 
these excessive fees paid by merchants are eventually passed on 
to consumers in the form of lower prices.88 It logically follows that 
a reduction in interchange fees paid by merchants should also 
reduce prices on consumer goods. 
In reality, a Federal Reserve Board study examining 
countries implementing interchange fee regulations shows that 
prices on consumer goods do not necessarily experience a 
corresponding reduction as a result of increased fee regulation.89 
Moreover, reports discussing Australia’s reduction of interchange 
fees in 2003 published by both the United States Government 
Accountability Office and Charles River Associates International, 
a business consulting firm, found no evidence that merchants’ 
savings were being passed along to the Australian consumers.90 
Data on consumer prices in the United States show that 
the Durbin Amendment has caused similar effects. An 
examination of the automobile gas industry provides further 
proof of an interchange fee reduction failing to reduce consumer 
prices. Gas retailers received over $1 billion in annual savings 
due to reduced interchange fees.91 While this should mean savings 
                                                 
http://report.heritage.org/wm3194. 
 86  Carpenter, supra note 66. 
 87  Winston & Strawn LLP, supra note 76. 
 88  Weisbaum, supra note 78. 
 89  Detweiler, supra note 82. 
 90  Id. 
 91  Gas Retailers Gained a $1 Billion Subsidy from Durbin Amendment, 
With No Evidence of Lowering Gas Prices, BUSINESS WIRE (Apr. 16, 2012 
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of roughly $0.03 per gallon, no savings have been passed on to 
consumers.92 This is especially disconcerting as debit cards 
account for one third of all transactions and over half of non-cash 
payments for gas retailers.93 If retailers that receive such a 
significant portion of their payments from debit cards are not 
passing along the saving to consumers, it is likely most retailers 
would refrain from doing so as well. 
Retail marketing consultant Kevin Coupe indicated that 
the Durbin Amendment would at least allow retailers to “hold the 
line” against prices increases.94 However, a study performed by 
the Electronic Payment Coalition found that consumer prices one 
year after the implementation of the Durbin Amendment actually 
rose 1.5%.95 The study examined prices at four major retailers 
and found the prices on most products increased from September 
2011 to September 2012.96 However, as the study failed to hold 
certain factors such as inflation constant, it is unclear the actual 
effect the Durbin Amendment had on consumer prices. According 
to the Consumer Price Index, from September 2011 to September 
2012 there was an inflation rate of just under 2%.97 Consequently, 
it appears that retailers were unable to “hold the line” on 
consumer prices and at most were able to stave off an additional 
0.5% in price increases.  
In addition to these major retailers, small business owners 
were also forced to raise prices for consumers because of the 
interchange regulations. Prior to the Durbin Amendment, small 
business owners who sold low priced goods received a discount 
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 92  Victor Nava & Anthony Randazzo, Durbin Swipe Fee Watch V: Gas 
Retailers, REASON FOUNDATION BLOG (Apr. 23, 2012, 12:20 PM), 
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MULTICHANNEL MERCHANT (Jun. 9, 2011, 11:27 AM), 
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 95  Electronic Payment Coalition, Where’s the Debit Discount? The Durbin 
Effect: Retailers Gain without Consumer Benefit, 9 (Sep. 28, 2012), available at 
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2012). 
McGinnisArticleFinal.docxMcGinnisArticleFinal.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/11/2013  5:07 PM 
298 Loyola Consumer Law Review Vol. 25:2/3 
from financial institutions on interchange fees for goods under 
$10.98 However, the banking industry has largely eliminated these 
discounts in order to make up some of the lost revenue from the 
overall caps on fees.99 As a result, many businesses are raising 
their prices on low-priced goods in order to cover these increased 
interchange costs. 
For example, Redbox, a company that operates movie 
rental vending machines, raised their prices from $1 per movie 
per day to $1.20 on October 31, 2011.100 Redbox admits on their 
company website that the increased cost is due to “rising 
operational costs, including increased debit card fees.”101 
Beginning in January 2012, many vending machine operators 
that accept credit and debit cards either raised prices or began 
offering a $0.25 discount for customers who paid in cash.102 
Consequently, instead of consumers benefiting from lower prices, 
the cap on interchange fees led to little difference with large 
merchants and actually resulted in slight price increases from 
small retailers. 
B. Elimination of Debit Card Rewards Programs 
Debit card rewards programs allow customers to earn 
points for actions like spending, carrying high balances, and 
making minimum deposits.103 These points are then used by 
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http://www.redbox.com/pricechange (last visited October 3, 2012). 
 102  Sidel, supra note 98. 
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Program, CNN MONEY (Mar. 28, 2011, 10:08 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2011/03/25/pf/debit_rewards/index.htm. 
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consumers to redeem merchandise, gift cards, or even cash.104 
Rewards programs are used by banks to encourage consumers to 
use debit cards because these transactions are profitable for the 
financial institutions.105 
Before the Durbin Amendment took effect on October 1, 
2011, banks had already eliminated most rewards programs on 
debit cards.106 As early as March 2011, Wells Fargo, Sun Trust, 
and JPMorgan Chase had announced that they would no longer 
offer debit card rewards programs.107 PNC Bank quickly 
followed in September of 2011, announcing that they would no 
longer be offering customers free checking or debit rewards.108 
Even USAA, a part co-operative serving primarily U.S. military 
personnel, veterans, and their families, was forced to shut down 
their rewards program.109 USAA account holders consequently 
lost an average of $84 per year due to the elimination of these 
programs.110 In this instance, the Durbin Amendment is taking 
money directly out of consumers’ pockets. 
C. New Fees on Consumer Bank Accounts 
Jamie Dimon, the president and CEO of JPMorgan Chase, 
compared how banks will respond to the Durbin Amendment to 
how a restaurant would deal with a similar situation. He 
explained that, “if you’re a restaurant and you cannot charge for 
the soda, you’re going to charge [more] for the burger. Over time, 
it will all be repriced into the business.”111 This highlights how 
increased costs on debit services and other banking transactions 
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is a foreseeable consequence of the Durbin Amendment. In other 
countries that regulate interchange fees, consumers now pay 
periodic account fees, checking account fees, and transactions 
fees.112 In response to the lost revenue, banks are often required to 
alter their business model in order to keep up their profits.113 The 
Eighth Circuit even argued in TCF National Bank v. Bernanke 
that the likelihood of increased debit card service fees is what 
makes the Durbin Amendment legal and prevents it from serving 
as a price control.114 It is clear that increased fees on consumers 
are not only likely, but they also appear to be necessary to ensure 
the amendment’s legality.  
According to a survey conducted by Bankrate.com, in 
2012 only 39% of banks offered free checking, defined as 
accounts with no minimum balance requirements and no 
monthly fee.115 This decreased from 45% in 2011, the year in 
which the Durbin Amendment was implemented, and 76% at its 
peak in 2009.116 Rather, in 2012, the average monthly 
maintenance fee for noninterest-bearing checking accounts rose 
25% to a record high of $5.48.117 However, some large banks, 
such as Bank of America, originally announced plans to charge a 
$5 monthly fee for debit card services which were previously 
free.118 Due to customer outcries, many banks abandoned these 
plans.119 Banks instead have raised amounts on existing fees, such 
as on ATM machines, overdrafts, and checking accounts.120  
Examples of banks increasing fees include Sun Trust, the 
11th largest bank in the United States, who raised charges on 
overdrafts from $25 to $36 on August 24, 2012.121 Sun Trust also 
increased its minimum balance requirement to avoid a $7 
monthly fee on checking accounts from $500 to $1,500.122 
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Similarly, Wells Fargo stopped offering free checking accounts 
and now requires account balances to exceed $1500 each month 
to avoid a $7 monthly fee and in December 2011 TD Bank 
increased their fees on services like wire transfers and money 
orders and instituted a $9 fee for consumers making more than 
six withdrawals during a billing cycle.123  
Banks have also begun charging higher fees to use ATMs. 
ATM fees charged by the institution that owns the ATM 
increased 4% in 2012, along with an 11% increase in fees charged 
by banks for out-of-network ATM withdrawals.124 Overall, this 
means an average fee of over $4 for out-of-network ATM 
withdrawals for consumers.125   
In addition to the fees instituted by large banks, small 
financial institutions have also been forced to increase banking 
fees. As the Durbin Amendment causes a decline in the number of 
debit card transactions, operating costs for small banks increase 
per account and per transaction.126 Thus, small banks will also be 
forced to issue fees on consumers in order to support these 
operations.127 
These checking fees predominantly affect consumers from 
lower and moderate income levels, as wealthy consumers have 
avoided the fees by easily maintaining minimum account 
balances.128 Industry experts estimate that up to 5% of consumers 
will be forced out of the banking system as the costs of 
maintaining a bank account increase to cover the reduction in 
debit interchange.129 
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D. Reduced Access to Banking Services 
One of the benefits of the growth of debit cards and the 
banking industry has been increased bank branches, longer 
branch hours, and more days of service.130 Since the Durbin 
Amendment, financial institutions have begun to cut back on 
these banking services due to their decreased revenue.131 In order 
to cut costs, Bank of America eliminated 17,800 jobs through 
September 30, 2012.132 In September of 2011, the Texas-based 
IBC Bank also closed fifty-five supermarket-based locations and 
eliminated 500 jobs.133 The loss of the bank branches and 
banking employees means fewer banking services are being 
offered. Overall, these lost banking services impair the quality of 
banking provided to consumers. 
V. OUTLOOK UNDER THE DURBIN AMENDMENT 
Despite attempts by financial institutions and consumer 
advocate groups to inform regulators of the detrimental effects of 
the Durbin Amendment, the amendment was passed, 
implemented, and upheld after being challenged in federal 
court.134 In light of the amendment’s staying power, this section 
evaluates the effect that regulations on interchange fees will have 
moving forward. First, the innovations consumers have 
experienced within the banking industry will become less 
profound. Furthermore, now that merchants have succeeded in 
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regulating fees on debit cards, they will likely turn their attention 
to interchange fees for credit cards. However, one benefit for 
consumers may be an additional payment option on bills for 
consumers. This section highlights these likely outcomes and how 
they will affect consumers. 
A. Limited Innovation in Banking Services 
The U.S. financial services market has developed an 
industry that provides proven benefits to consumers. Some of 
these benefits include mobile banking, internet based services, 
identity verification services, risk management, and consumer 
education programs.135 The revenues collected from interchange 
fees are not merely profits for banks, but rather they fund many 
of the programs and benefits consumers receive from banks.136 
The Durbin Amendment’s limitation on the revenue financial 
institutions can collect on debit card transactions limits the 
funding necessary to support innovation and investment in 
network operations.137 As a result, consumers will see less 
innovation in areas such as risk management, security, loyalty 
programs, product development, and user education due to the 
limited capital available for investment.138  
For instance, funding by financial institutions for fraud 
prevention and customer authentication is largely funded by 
revenue from interchange fees.139 Banks will be forced to either 
pass the cost of forgery or fraud protection to the consumers or to 
cut investment in developing technology in these areas.140 A sign 
of this stress was revealed in the 2012 Faces of Fraud Survey, 
which found that only 11% of financial institutions indicated 
being in compliance with federal regulations for security controls 
in conformance with the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council Guidelines.141 Whether banks pass the cost 
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of these programs along to consumers or simply decrease funding 
for security and innovation, consumers are likely to feel the 
effects. 
B. Interchange Fees on Credit Cards 
Like debit cards, credit card transactions require an 
interchange fee to be paid by merchants. Two factors make it 
likely that credit card interchange fees will be the next fees to be 
regulated. First, interchange fees on credit cards, especially 
rewards cards, are significantly higher than debit card fees.142 
Now that merchants have succeeded in lowering the costs of 
debit card transactions, they are beginning to turn their resources 
towards regulating credit card transaction fees.143 In July of 2012, 
a settlement was reached between retailers and Visa, 
MasterCard, and a number of major banks over price-fixing 
claims on credit card interchange fees.144 Large merchant groups, 
however, have begun to disavow the settlement as it limits legal 
challenges that could be brought in the future.145 As this 
perspective accounts for the likelihood of future challenges to 
transaction fees by merchants, it appears these groups also 
believe that credit card regulations are the next challenge facing 
the banking industry. 
The second factor is that merchants are unable to 
differentiate between payment methods when setting their prices, 
which causes merchants to have to account for significant 
interchange fees that come with credit card transactions when 
setting their prices.146 This may be a significant reason why 
regulations on interchange fees for debit cards alone has not 
reduced prices for consumers. Therefore, in order to succeed at 
lowering prices for consumers, credit card interchange fees will 
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also have to be regulated. Both of these factors highlight how the 
Durbin Amendment has set the stage for future caps on credit 
card transactions in addition to debit card caps. 
C. Increased Options for Bill Payment Methods 
While card payments account for over 72% of payments in 
retail stores, only a small fraction of loan and bill payments are 
made this way.147 One possible benefit from the Durbin 
Amendment may be that more companies will offer debit cards as 
a payment method for loans and bills.148 With lower interchange 
fees being charged to these companies and institutions, there is 
more incentive to offer an additional payment option for the 
convenience of consumers. While this small benefit does not 
outweigh many of the negative effects of the Durbin Amendment, 
it is important to realize that benefits will be realized.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
Senator Dick Durbin may have had the best intentions in 
placing a cap on interchange fees charged in debit card 
transactions, but the real life consequences turned out to be 
largely negative. Consumers have been adversely affected, having 
begun to lose many of their previous banking benefits. Financial 
institutions have consistently argued that such regulations would 
harm consumers, but regulators paid little attention, possibly 
assuming their intentions were purely selfish. In reality, consumer 
interests in relation to the banking industry and debit card 
programs are largely in line with those of the banks.   
After a year of life under the Durbin Amendment, it has 
become obvious that consumers are not benefiting from the 
amendment’s regulation and are in fact paying for or losing their 
banking services. Studies examining prices within the gas and 
retail industries and small businesses show that savings are not 
being passed onto consumers and that prices are even increasing. 
Meaning, the revenue merchants are saving on reduced 
interchange fees are being retained rather than passed on to 
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consumers.  
Furthermore, due to reduced revenue from interchange 
fees banks are eliminating some banking service or increasing 
prices to retain them. For example, debit card rewards programs 
and free checking accounts have been eliminated by many banks. 
Other banks have kept these services, but introduced annual fees 
on debit cards and monthly fees on checking accounts. Banks 
have also been forced to lay off employees and close some branch 
locations as a result of the reduced revenue.  
Some of the benefits of interchange fee regulation, 
however, may not be realized because higher interchange fees are 
still permitted on credit cards. Therefore, the regulation of credit 
card interchange fees may be where the Durbin Amendment is 
taking the banking industry. Moreover, with reduced revenue the 
banking industry may produce less innovation in products and 
services in the foreseeable future. 
The only way to correct the negative impact of capped 
interchange fees on consumers is to repeal the Durbin 
Amendment. While the implementation of interchange fee 
regulation on credit cards may help to actually reduce consumer 
prices, the elimination of credit card rewards and additional 
banking services would counteract this benefit. Only the repeal of 
the Durbin Amendment will return the quality of banking 
services, rewards programs, and lower retail prices to consumers.  
 
